Abstract. The square root is an important mathematical primitive whose secure, efficient, distributed computation has so far not been possible. We present a solution to this problem based on Goldschmidt's algorithm. The starting point is computed by linear approximation of the normalized input using carefully chosen coefficients. The whole algorithm is presented in the fixed-point arithmetic framework of Catrina/Saxena for secure computation. Experimental results demonstrate the feasibility of our algorithm and we show applicability by using our protocol as a building block for a secure QR-Decomposition of a rational-valued matrix.
Introduction
Secure Multi-Party-Computation (SMPC) is an important branch of cryptography which enables a number of distinct entities (or parties) to securely evaluate any function without any of them having to reveal their particular input. The problem was first presented in [16] Shamir's ([14] ) and is the most versatile and practical scheme for secure computations with non-integer numbers developed so far. We describe how it can be extended by a protocol that securely computes the square root. It is based on Goldschmidt's algorithm for square root rather than Newton-Raphson iterations mainly because each iteration contains fewer dependent multiplications for virtually identical computation complexity. However, since Goldschmidt's algorithm is not self-correcting, the last iteration is Newton-Raphson to correct for accumulated rounding errors ([13] ). The starting point -correct up to 5.4 bits -is computed by linear approximation.
We view our protocol not so much as a stand-alone application, but rather as a building block for more intricate algorithms. One such application is the secure computation of the QR-Decomposition of matrices, which can be used to securely solve linear systems of equations 1 and is an important building block in many other numerical algorithms such as optimization algorithms and finding zeroes of functions.
In section 2 we will define cryptographic primitives and terminology. In sections 3 and 4 we will describe our algorithm and its implementation. In section 5 we will apply our algorithm to the QR-Decomposition of matrices and in section 6 we will present our experimental results. Lastly in section 7 we will draw a conclusion.
Cryptographic Primitives and Definitions
The cryptographic primitive underlying our algorithms is a linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS), such as Shamir's, with a multiplication protocol. Any secret shared number x will be written with braces [x], while any public constant c will be written without braces. To signify a secret-shared vector v we will add an arrow:
. A secret-shared matrix A will be written [[A] ]. All matrices -unless stated differently -will be assumed to be quadratic with n rows and columns.
On top of the LSSS we employ the fixed-point arithmetic presented in [3],[4] and [5] to facilitate computations with non-integer numbers. We assume that all numbers have total bit-length k of which f are fractional, i.e. are elements of Q <k,f > (cf. [5] ). In order to be able to represent these in a Secret Sharing Scheme all fixed-point numbers are scaled by 2 f before being secret-shared yielding the set Z <k,f > . Any number in Z <k,f > representing x 2 f will be denoted byx. Since secret-sharing requires a finite field we will treat Z <k,f > as if it were part of Z/qZ for a very large q (e.g. log 2 q ≈ l = 1024, k = 110). Note that because of this no wrap-around will occur and thus computations will not be affected by the fact that numbers are actually part of the much bigger Z/qZ. At some points in our protocols (pseudo-)random sharings of zero (PRSZ) need to be computed. We refer the reader to [8] for details.
We aim to develop algorithms secure in the so-called honest-but curious scenario in which parties may not deviate from the protocol. In addition we only require statistical and not information-theoretic security, i.e. the protocols can be simulated such that the distributions of the real and the simulated view are statistically indistinguishable ([5] ).
In the analysis of our algorithm we measure computation complexity using the unit of one secure multiplication.
